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EVIDENCE IN MALPRACTICE CASES: FUNK v. BONHAM
Malpractice cases often involve difficult questions of proof.
The general rule of evidence is that no particular kind of evi-
dence is necessary to prove the allegations of the plaintiff.'. In
the field of scientific learning, however, there is a fixed rule of
evidence that causal relations, which can not be understood by
one who is not scientifically trained, can be proven on trial only
by expert witnesses.2 This is of the first importance in mal-
practice cases since the effect of the physician's acts and medi-
cines fall within the field of scientific learning which only an
expert can interpret. It is conceded that a case of malpractice
may involve such clear instances of neglect that it will not be
necessary to employ expert testimony to establish the causal
relations involved.3 Especially in cases where the patient has
undergone a major operation, however, an instance in which
the proof of negligence would not be dependent upon expert
testimony would be extremely rare.
This rule requiring expert testimony in these cases is all the
more important in practice when we consider that in the usual
instance where a surgeon is sued for malpractice, the surgeon
himself or those working under his direct orders and in sympa-
thy with him are the only witnesses whose testimony will be
competent. The plaintiff has the burden of proving negligence.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, the defendant is pre-
sumed to have used reasonable care.4 It is rare in the general
field of litigation for the plaintiff, in the establishment of his
case, to be entirely dependent upon the testimony of the defend-
ant, or those who are employees of the defendant, or those who
from professional esprit de corps are likely to be favorable to the
defendant. In the usual malpractice case, however, this is the
situation. Thus the plaintiff must look forward to proving his
case if at all by the evidence of the defendant or the evidence of
those witnesses that the defendant will call.
In the case of Funk v. Bonham,5 appellee was a woman who
had been operated on for appendicitis and during the course of
the operation considerable other surgical work was found to be
1 Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2090.
2Adolay v.'Miller, 60 Ind. App. 656, 11 N. E. 333; Ewing v. Goode, 78
Fed. 442. See also Wigmore, sec. 2090, note 1.
3 Longfellow v. Vernon., 57 Ind. App. 611, 105 N. E. 178.
4 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2489, 2490, 2507.
5 Funk v. Bonham (No. 1229, Appellate Court of Indiana, March 10,
1926), 151 N. E. 22.
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necessary. This operation was the kind that is known as a
"deep abdominal" operation. In the course of its performance
it was necessary to "wall off" the intestines by the use of "sur-
gical sponges." These sponges were made of gauze folded to
about four thicknesses of cloth and about eight inches long by
four inches wide. It appeared by the evidence of the defendant
and by the nurses who aided in the operation that these surgi-
cal sponges were counted when inserted in the wound and were
again counted when taken out. The evidence of other physi-
cians as to the professional practice in this regard clearly estab-
lished that the count of the sponges had been made in the ap-
proved way. In this particular operation a number of these
sponges were used and in fact one of the sponges was left in
the cavity and the wound closed with the sponge inside. The
only witnesses at the trial were the appellant surgeon, the
nurses that aided in the operation, and other physicians called
to establish the professional practice of counting the sponges
when used in surgical operations. Appellee called no witnesses.
From the nature of the case, the operation was performed in
the operating room where friends of the patient were not al-
lowed. It was inevitable, therefore, if appellee were to estab-
lish her case, that she must do so by the evidence of appellant
and his witnesses.
On the trial below appellee was given a verdict and judgment
for $9,000. On review before the Appellate Court this judg-
ment was reversed on the ground that there was not sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict. In reaching this conclusion,
the Appellate Court considered three main questions in its opin-
ion. (1) Whether or not the work of removing sponges was an
integral part of the operation; (2) whether or not appellant
surgeon was liable for the negligence of the nurses in leaving
the sponge in the cavity when he inquired about the removal of
the sponges in the proper way and the nurses answered him in
the approved way that the count had been made of the sponges
put in and taken out of the wound, and that by this count it was
established that all the sponges were out. (3) Whether or not
negligence in the appellant surgeon could be shown apart from
this proper count of the sponges by the application of the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, on the theory that since the sponge
had been left in the wound and appellee had been injured there-
by, it must be presumed from the facts that appellant was
guilty of negligence in so conducting the operation that the
sponge was not removed from the cavity. The court entered into
the authorities with considerable care to show: (1) that the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
removal of the sponges was an integral part of the operation,
(2) that appellant was not responsible for the negligence of the
nurses in incorrectly informing him that the sponges were re-
moved when he was operating in a public hospital which he did
not control, when the nurses were the employees of the hospital,
and when he employed the nurses and the operating room in
accordance with the regulations of the hospital;7 and" (3) that
negligence in appellant physician could not be presumed from
the fact that an error was made in the course of the operation.
This last point was considered in great detail. It could be said
incidentally that some may not be surprised at the error of
counsel in thinking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied to
this case, when they consider that the object left in the wound
was a surgical sponge-four thicknesses of gauze, eight inches
long and four inches wide. But it seems quite clear that the
court has reached the right conclusion on this issue. The doc-
trine of res ips loquitur does not apply.8 A physician is held
responsible for reasonable care in the exercise of his duties.
What this reasonable care is will depend upon the nature of
the operation and the general standard of skill of physicians in
that community. A man is presumed to have acted with rea-
sonable skill until it is proven otherwise. Appellee could not
recover in this case unless she could establish affirmatively that
appellant surgeon had been guilty of some negligence regardless
of the fact that a surgical sponge of this size was left in the
wound. As the courts so often say, "A physician does not guar-
antee a cure nor is he the insurer of the results that flow from
his services."
After reaching these conclusions on the three points set forth
above, the court decided that the judgment of the trial court
6 Longfellow v. Vernon, 57 Ind. App. 611, 105 N. E. 178.
lBaker v. Wentworth, 155 Mass. 338, 29 N. E. 589.
8 Cassingham v. Berry, 67 Okla. 134, 150 P. 139; NiebeZ v. Winslow, 88
N. J. L. 191, 95 A. 995; Brown v. Bennett et al., 151 Mich. 654, 122 N. W.
305.
"The naked facts that defendant performed operations on her eye, and
that pain followed, and that subsequently the eye was in such a bad con-
dition that it had to be extracted, established neither the neglect and un-
skillfulness of the treatment, nor the casual connection between it and the
unfortunate event. A physician is not a warrantor of cures. If the maxim,
'res ipso loquitur' were applicable to a case like this, and a failure to cure
were held to be evidence, however slight, of negligence on the part of the
physician or surgeon causing the bad result, few would be courageous
enough to practice the healing art, for they would have to assume financial
liability for nearly all the 'ills that flesh is heir to.'" From the opinion of
Mr. Justice Taft in Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442.
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could not be affirmed because "the verdict of the jury in this
case was not sustained by competent evidence." 9 It seems to the
writer that the conclusions of the court are correct on all the
points discussed, but that the decision they reach does not follow
from these conclusions. Appellee was under a burden affirma-
tively to prove appellant negligent; in view of the conditions
under which the operation was performed and the requirement
of expert testimony in malpractice cases, appellee was largely
dependent upon the evidence of appellant himself to establish
her case. The court says "the verdict of the jury in this case
was not sustained by competent evidence." The only evidence
admitted in the case was evidence by appellant, the nurses, and
other physicians who testified as to medical practice. It is sub-
mitted that on the court's own analysis all of these witnesses
are "competent" and the evidence that they submitted was
"competent." The question at issue then is whether this evi-
dence which was by experts and entirely competent had the
effect of proving negligence in appellant as alleged in the com-
plaint. The following principles are basic in the law of evidence
and are of general application.
(1) The rule that "the jury shall find in accordance with the
preponderance of the evidence in civil cases" does not require
any mechanical or numerical counting of witnesses under which
the jury must find for the defendant if three witnesses testify
for him and only two for the plaintiff."'10 If one witness for
either the plaintiff or the defendant submitted evidence from
which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff, then a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff must be upheld although there
were a hundred witnesses for the defendant and although their
testimony was in conflict with that of the one witness. (2) A
single witness for the defendant may give testimony which
brings out sufficient evidence for the plaintiff to warrant the
jury in finding for the plaintiff on the basis of that evidence
alone." (3) The verdict of the jury in the trial court must
be sustained on appeal where the only ground of attack is the
lack of sufficient evidence to justify the verdict, unless the Ap-
pellate Court can find affirmatively that there was insufflcient
9 Funk v. Bonham, 151 N. E., at p. 24.
10 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2033. Also see sec. 2033, note 3 in which
a comment on this principle by Napoleon is quoted from Bonnier, Traite,
Des Preuves (ed. 188S), see. 293. The epigram of Napoleon was as follows:
"Thus one honorable man by his testimony could not prove a single rascal
guilty though two rascals by their testimony could prove an honorable man
guilty."
11 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2034, rule 2.
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evidence to sustain the verdict.12 Thus it is constantly asserted
that the Appellate Court will not "weigh the evidence," but that
it will sustain the verdict of a jury-or the finding of a judge
on questions of fact-unless it feels that no reasonable jury
nor reasonable judge could reach such a conclusion on the facts
contained in the record.
If we may assume that appellee had competent legal advice,
it follows inevitably that she could hope to establish her case
only through testimony of appellant and adverse witnesses,
since the court correctly points out that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply and appellant is hot liable for the negli-
gence of the nurses employed by the hospital. Putting appellee's
case in the most unfavorable light, it must be conceded that it
was at least possible for the evidence of appellant or appellant's
witnesses to establish negligence in appellant himself. There
is no statement or indication in the court's entire opinion which
indicates that the court found from the record that no such evi-
dence of negligence in the defendant was deducible from ap-
pellant's own testimony or that of his witnesses. Since appellant
and other witnesses called on his behalf were the only ones who
testified, sin~e the verdict of the jury must be presumed to be
12State ex rel. Drudge v. Davisson, 174 Ind. 705, 93 N. E. 6; Ray v.
Baker, 165 Ind. 74; Seiberling & Co. v. Porter, 165 Ind. 7; Karges Furn. Co.
v. Amalgamated, etc., Union, 165 Ind. 421. See this last case annotated
and the case discussed in 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 788. See also Trinkle v.
Wallis, 167 Ind. 382; Parkison v. Thompson, 164 Ind. 609; Hudelson v.
Hudelson, 164 Ind. 694.
The provision in Act of 1903, p. 338, being section 8 of the Act of the
Legislature "concerning proceedings and civil procedure," does not apply
here. It gives the Superior and Appellate Courts power to weigh the evi-
dence in cases that are not subject to jury trial. The issues involved are
discussed in Parkison v. Thompson, 164 Ind. 609 at 618. See Burns 1926,
sec. 723, and cases there cited.
"If then there is any evidence to support the verdict we cannot reverse
the judgment, because we must suppose it was that evidence which convinced
the jury and the court, and the evidence which contradicted it was not cred-
ible and therefore disregarded." Christy v. Holmes, 57 Ind. 314 at 315.
"The general doctrine is declared and enforced in the many scores of
cases which hold that it will be assumed that the verdict is supported by
the evidence." Eliot on Appellate Procedure, p. 680.
"It is, therefore, presumed that the decision of a court is correct until
the contrary is affirmatively shown. This presumption is one of the strong-
est known in the law and can only be overcome by a record which shows
unequivocally that an error was committed. It follows that the person at-
tacking a judgement on appeal must present a record which affirmatively
shows that such judgment is erroneous; and wherein such record fails to
show error the appellate tribunal will presume that it does not exist."
Ewbank's Manual on Practice (2nd ed.), sec. 198.
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based on sufficient evidence in the absence of a finding by the
appellate court to the contrary, it follows a fortiori that the
judgment below should have been affirmed.
The only direct reference which the court gives to the evi-
dence in support of appellee's claim is in the course of its con-
sideration of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. "Several sur-
geons of wide experience in surgery also testified that the method
used by appellant as to keeping track of the sponges used, was
the method which was accepted among surgeons generally as
being "standard," and "approved" method in the handling and
removal of sponges used in the operation such as that performed
upon appellee, and there was no testimony to the contrary."'
In other words, there was no testimony to the contrary in regard
to the approved method of counting the sponges. The court
does not here or in any other place find affirmatively that there
was no testimony of negligence in the appellant apart from the
counting of the sponges. On the contrary, earlier in the opin-
ion, the court concludes that the doctor is not liable for the negli-
gence of the nurses and then says "the only question which there-
fore remains is as to the personal negligence of the appellant
herein."14
It will not seriously be contended that any rules of evidence
require the appellant to be found not guilty of negligence merely
because he follows the approved method of counting the sponges.
If this were true, he could perform an operation in a manner
which all his professional associates would term negligent, but
could save himself from liability merely by going through the
form of requiring a count of the sponges.'- The medical pro-
13 Fmnk v. Bonharm, 151 N. E. 22 at p. 26. It will be noted that all the
cases which the court cites as indicating that the doctrine of res ipso loquitur
does not apply set forth affirmatively that there was no actual evidence of
negligence in the defendant from which the jury could find for the plaintiff.
14 Fu k v. Bonham, 151 N. E. 22 at p. 24. It is clear that the court does
not refer to the evidence of affirmative negligence or of evidence of negli-
gence at all except to say that there was evidence that the method used by
the doctor was the approved method of counting sponges and that "there
was no evidence to the contrary." This is not a finding that there was no
evidence of affirmative negligence in the appellant apart from the count of
the sponges.
16 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2034, and cases there cited. Also sec. 2090.
It may well be that if appellee in this case did not produce affirmative
evidence of appellant's negligence, there was no proper case to go to the
jury and the trial judge might have directed a verdict for appellant. Appel-
lee was dependent upon the testimony of appellant and his witnesses. It
might have been necessary, therefore, for appellee to call appellant and his
witnesses in order to secure sufficient testimony to go to the jury in the first
place. This point is not considered on appeal, however. We may assume,
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fession has fixed upon the counting of sponges as a reasonable
precaution. If, therefore, the appellant required the counting
of sponges in the usual way it would appear that he was not
negligent in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Paren-
thetically one might suggest that the nurses were perhaps gross-
ly incompetent if they failed to count a sponge of that size, es-
pecially when using a particular method for counting which was
calculated to insure against any possible error. It would fairly
be expected, therefore, not only that their evidence in behalf of
appellant surgeon did not favorably impress the jury, but also
that their own testimony on cross examination might well have
brought out evidence of negligence in performing the mechanical
count in addition to positive evidence of negligence apart from
this mechanical count. In any case, expert evidence of his negli-
gence may have appeared in the testimony of appellant or his
own witnesses. We have the verdict of the jury that appellant
was negligent; and unless the Appellate Court can find affirma-
tively that there was no evidence of such negligence, the judg-
ment of the lower court on the verdict should have been sus-
tained.
Under the Indiana Constitution "the Supreme Court shall,
upon the decision of each case, give a statement in writing of
each question arising in the record of such case and the decision
of the court thereon."' 16 Under our court interpretation of this
provision it is clear that the court is obligated to give its opinion
in writing of each point which is material to the decision of
the case.17 By statute the Appellate Court of Indiana is re-
quired to do the same thing in every case where the Appellate
Court reverses the judgment of the lower court.'8 It should be
noted that this is a decision of the Appellate Court in which the
judgment of the lower court is reversed; and hence under our
law the court was obligated to set forth in writing its opinion
on every point "material to the decision of the case." It is
submitted in this instance that the one question material to the
decision of this case is the presence or absence of sufficient evi-
therefore, that appellant did not ask for a directed verdict at the completion
of appellee's evidence. This reasonable objection is, therefore, waived; and
if there is affirmative evidence of appellant's negligence in the record as pre-
sented to the appellate court, the appellate court is bound to consider this
evidence in determining the question of whether or not there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury. See the comment by Mr. Jus-
tice Taft in Ewing v. Goode, 78 Ind. 442.
16 Burns 1926, sec. 172.
17 Willets V. Ridgeway, 9 Ind. 367.
18 Burns 1926, sec. 1361.
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dence to sustain the verdict of the jury in finding that appellant
had been guilty of negligence as alleged in the complaint. 19
The writer realizes that it may be very improbable that the
evidence of appellant or his witnesses was such as to establish
appellee's case. It must be conceded also, however, that when
one sues a surgeon for malpractice, and the defendant and his
associates are the only experts present, it is extremely unlikely
that the plaintiff will be able to establish his case regardless of
its merit. From these two admissions, it would seem to follow
that the court should be especially vigilant to secure to the plain-
tiff such rights as he has to prove his case under the difficult sit-
uation involved. It seems that the rules of evidence applying to
malpractice cases are sound and that they are properly rigorous
in protecting the defendant surgeon against the unbridled sym-
pathy of the jury in awarding damages to a plaintiff who has
unfortunately suffered from the error of the surgeon. It will
be noted that in no other field of the law of evidence are the
rules so stringent in the requirements for competent testimony
in order to prove the allegation of the complaint. Once the
rules of law have been fully complied with, however, the plain-
tiff is done a serious injustice if he is unable to use the meager
evidence which is likely to be available.
In this case it seems clear that the court rested its reversal of
the lower court's judgment on three main grounds: (1) that
appellant was not liable for the negligence of the nurses, (2)
that he had employed the usual professional requirement of
counting the sponges in the proper way, and (3) that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply. The truth of all these
propositions laid down by the court may be conceded in full
without in any way justifying its decision. After completing its
discussion of legal points involved, the court puts its decision
squarely on the ground "that the verdict of the jury in this case
was not sustained by any competent evidence." It can not be
questioned but what the evidence submitted by appellant and
19 When the court finally bases its decision on the ground "tested by the
authorities, we must hold that the verdict of the jury in this case was not
sustained by any competent evidence," it is clear that the court is referring
to the evidence which it has discussed, especially since it says "tested by the
authorities," which must mean the authorities it has referred to directly
or indirectly. It certainly has not set forth any authorities which hold that
evidence of appellant's negligence could not be found in the testimony of
appellant and his witnesses. It clearly indicated that it has disregarded
the possibility of such evidence, since it concludes that appellant is not a
warrantor of the result of the operation and hence evidence incidental to
this theory or the theory of res ipsa loquitur is not competent
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his witnesses was "competent"; there is no specific finding that
this competent evidence did not support the allegation of appel-
lee. It is submitted that there might have been competent evi-
dence of appellant's negligence from the testimony of appellant
himself apart from the question of the mechanical count of
sponges. Unless the court could find that there was no such
evidence upon which a jury reasonably could have found for
appellee, the court was required as a matter of law to affirm the
judgment on appeal.
PAUL L. SAYRE.
Indiana University School of Law.
